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Health Care Competition Law in the Shadow of State
Action: Minimizing MACs
David A. Hyman* & William E. Kovacic**
How should we go about reconciling competition and consumer
protection in health care given the long shadow cast by the state action
doctrine? We consider that issue using a case study drawn from an
obscure corner of the pharmaceutical reimbursement market to motivate
and inform our analysis. We show how the balance between competition
and consumer protection is distorted by the political economy of health
care regulation—compounded by the extension of the state action
doctrine far past its defensible borders. If anything, considerations of
political economy argue for much greater skepticism about the utility of
regulation—and of the state action doctrine—in the health care space.
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Attempting to protect competition by focusing solely on private
restraints is like trying to stop the flow of water at a fork in a stream by
blocking only one of the channels. Unless you block both channels, you
are not likely to even slow, much less stop, the flow. Eventually, all the
water will flow toward the unblocked channel. The same is true of
antitrust enforcement. If you create a system in which private price
fixing results in a jail sentence, but accomplishing the same objective
through government regulation is always legal, you have not completely
addressed the competitive problem. You have simply dictated the form
that it will take.1

INTRODUCTION
George Bernard Shaw famously observed that “all professions are
1. Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, State Intervention/State Action—A U.S.
Perspective, Remarks at the Fordham Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law & Policy
(Oct. 24, 2003), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/stateintervention/state-action-u.s.perspective/fordham031024.pdf.
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conspiracies against the laity.” 2 In health care, the bill of particulars is
long and distinguished, and includes overt price fixing, attacks on salaried
practice and pre-paid health care, and the systematic marginalization and
exclusion of competitors.3 Indeed, Professors Havighurst and King
accurately note that the entire history of medical care in the United States
is a story in which “outbreaks of . . . competition were ruthlessly
suppressed.”4 Of course, these campaigns were waged in the name of
“medical science, quality of care, and professional prerogative,” rather
than the naked self-interest of the medical profession.5 But regardless of
the external branding, the effect was the same: the medical profession
was able to set the terms of trade, and exclude or substantially limit the
authorized scope of practice for new entrants.6 Emboldened by these
successes, other health care providers used similar tactics to protect their
turf and set the terms of trade.
In health care, private individuals and entities were the first movers,
but those involved quickly recognized the value of enlisting the
government in their conspiracies against the laity. Compared to privately
imposed restraints on trade, governmental restraints “are more effective
and efficient, and include a built-in cartel enforcement mechanism.”7
And, as we detail below, governmentally imposed restraints are much
harder to attack than private restraints.
The consequences of these dynamics were quite predictable. Over

2. GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, THE DOCTOR’S DILEMMA act 1 (1909). The play was first staged
in 1906.
3. See David A. Hyman, When and Why Lawyers Are the Problem, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 267,
272 (2008) (noting that the medical profession has attempted to “resist the forces of competition,”
and that these efforts “neatly coincide with the protection of physicians’ incomes, prerogatives, and
control of the means of production”). See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
IMPROVING
HEALTH
CARE:
A
DOSE
OF
COMPETITION
(2004),
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/040723healthcarerpt.pdf
[hereinafter
FTC-DOJ,
IMPROVING] (discussing competition law and health law); FED. TRADE COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF
FTC ANTITRUST ACTIONS IN HEALTH CARE SERVICES AND PRODUCTS, 3–75 (2013),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/competition-policy-guidance/hcupdate.pdf
(discussing conduct that raises antitrust concerns in the health care industry) [hereinafter FTC,
OVERVIEW].
4. Clark C. Havighurst & Nancy M. P. King, Private Credentialing of Health Care Personnel: An
Antitrust Perspective—Part Two, 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 263, 291 (1983).
5. Id.
6. Id. (concluding that the medical profession “was able to repel most attacks along its borders,
to force many of its antagonists into alliances, and to confine other would be invaders to narrow
enclaves”).
7. David A. Hyman & Shirley Svorny, If Professions Are Just “Cartels by Another Name,”
What Should We Do About It?, 163 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 101, 121 n.99 (2014),
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/penn_law_review_online/vol163/iss1/7.
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time, the health care marketplace became enmeshed in a complex web of
interlocking public and private restraints of trade. Not coincidentally,
health care spending and the rate of spending growth spiraled upward.
For these and other reasons, health care became a target-rich
environment for antitrust enforcers beginning in the early 1970s. 8
Indeed, several generations of enforcement personnel at the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”) cut their teeth on merger reviews and cases
involving every conceivable participant in the health care sector,
including hospitals, doctors, pharmaceutical companies, and pharmacy
benefit managers (“PBMs”).9 As we noted in a recent article:
Since the 1970s, the FTC has devoted considerable effort to health care,
beginning with a major case challenging restrictions on advertising in
the medical profession, and then going on from there to bring cases
involving every aspect of the health care delivery system. In health
care, the FTC has batted through its entire rotation of policy tools,
including numerous cases, rulemaking, advisory opinions, hearings,
and competition advocacy. More than any other program, the health
care program has paid the rent for the FTC’s charter as a competition
authority.10

The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) Antitrust Division and state
attorneys general have also been active in this space, albeit on a less
continuous basis than the FTC.
The campaign against anticompetitive practices within the health care
sector has had its ups and downs, but it is clear that it has had an impact
on the frequency and severity of privately imposed anticompetitive
restraints.11 The picture for publicly imposed restraints is considerably
murkier, because such restraints are effectively insulated from
substantive antitrust scrutiny, as long as they qualify as state action—no
matter how overtly anticompetitive they are and no matter how flimsy
8. We explore the decision of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) to focus on health care
markets in William E. Kovacic & David A. Hyman, Consume or Invest: What Do/Should Agency
Leaders Maximize?, 91 WASH. L. REV. 295 (2016).
9. See, e.g., WILLIAM BLUMENTHAL, FED. TRADE COMM’N, BACKGROUND MATERIALS: A
PRIMER ON THE APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAW TO THE PROFESSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
(Sept. 29, 2006), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/primerapplication-antitrust-law-professions-united-states/20060929cbablumenthalmaterials_0.pdf
(reviewing the FTC’s activity in the health care space); FTC-DOJ, IMPROVING, supra note 3
(same); FTC, OVERVIEW, supra note 3 (same); John E. Kwoka, Jr., The Federal Trade Commission
and the Professions: A Quarter Century of Accomplishment and Some New Challenges, 72
ANTITRUST L.J. 997 (2005) (same).
10. Kovacic & Hyman, supra note 8, at 313.
11. Plus, in yet another example of demand creating supply, there is now a thriving health care
antitrust private bar, along with the requisite American Bar Association section, American Health
Lawyers Association practice group, and numerous opportunities to obtain continuing legal
education (“CLE”) credits for attending health care antitrust conferences in glamorous locales.
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their supposed justification. And, in health care, there is no shortage of
overtly anticompetitive restraints, imposed on the basis of flimsy or
nonexistent evidence, at the behest of politically connected special
interests.
These dynamics complicate the already complex process of
reconciling competition and consumer protection in health care—because
much of what is styled as consumer protection is, in fact, provider
protection. The same dynamics also argue in favor of re-examining the
appropriate boundaries of the state action doctrine.
This Article examines these issues using a case study drawn from an
obscure corner of the pharmaceutical reimbursement market—maximum
allowable cost (“MAC”) schedules. MACs, which are used to reimburse
pharmacies for dispensing generic drugs, were pioneered by state
Medicaid programs and subsequently adopted by PBMs. But, in the past
few years, MACs have become the focal point of heated controversies
between PBMs and pharmacies, triggering legislative action in thirtyseven states. Although the dispute is invariably cast in terms of consumer
protection (framed in terms of patients’ ability to access to pharmacy
services), this Article makes it clear that the issue is really about
protecting the providers of pharmacy services from the disruptive forces
of competition.
Part II lays out some of the complexities of reconciling competition
and consumer protection in health care. Part III reviews the basics of the
state action doctrine. Part IV presents our case study of MACs. Part V
sketches out some suggestions on how to improve matters—both for
MACs and for the larger set of issues for which MACs are a stand-in.
I. RECONCILING COMPETITION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION IN HEALTH
CARE
How should we think about reconciling competition and consumer
protection in health care? The preconditions for perfectly competitive
markets (including no barriers to entry or exit; fungible goods; and
perfect information) are obviously not applicable to health care. And
health care combines high stakes, profound asymmetries of information,
and deep moral opposition to acknowledging the existence of resource
constraints.
Because of the felt necessities created by these dynamics, health care
is a field dominated by regulation. The laundry list of regulations
includes strict restrictions on entry (i.e., licensure, accreditation,
certificates of need or public necessity, and restrictions on scope of
practice); specification of minimum terms of trade (i.e., mandated
benefits, any willing providers, and voiding of liability waivers); and
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aggressive ex post enforcement (i.e., hospital privileges proceedings,
state disciplinary action, and medical malpractice litigation). Each and
every one of these regulatory initiatives is sold on the basis that they are
absolutely necessary consumer protections—and the alternative is an
unregulated market that would operate “as a savage war of all against all,
red in tooth and claw, populated solely by charlatans and snake oil
vendors.”12
Most of the health law professoriate is perfectly fine with this extensive
list of anticompetitive restraints. Indeed, if anything, the health law
professoriate has devoted most of its time to identifying and cataloging
new ways to further tame or supplant the market for health care goods
and services. In fairness, such attitudes are inextricably linked to the
general political commitments of the law professoriate, and are not
limited to professors that focus on health law. But, for the sake of
argument, assume that there is a constituency that might be open to
arguments in favor of striking an actual balance between competition and
consumer protection, rather than simply assuming that anything and
everything that emerges from the legislative and regulatory process is aok. What would that argument look like?
The argument would begin by noting that markets have developed
plenty of strategies for signaling and evaluating quality in health care. 13
It would also observe that competition is itself a powerful tool for
protecting consumers. Legislators and regulators are poorly informed
under the best of circumstances—and health policy is never made under
the best of circumstances. Finally, legislators and regulators do not have
anywhere near the proper incentives to arrive at optimal policy
solutions.14
The most entertaining argument for skepticism about the merits and
distributional consequences of legislative/regulatory intervention was
cuttingly stated by P.J. O’Rourke:
When government does, occasionally, work, it works in an elitist
fashion. That is, government is most easily manipulated by people who
have money and power already. This is why government benefits
usually go to people who don’t need benefits from government.
Government may make some environmental improvements, but these
will be improvements for rich bird-watchers. And no one in

12. Hyman & Svorny, supra note 7, at 116.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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government will remember that when poor people go bird-watching
they do it at Kentucky Fried Chicken.15

Stated differently, in the health care space, governmental action
“generally favors the concentrated interests of incumbent providers and
hurts, rather than helps, consumers.”16 Given the unsavory alliance of
Bootleggers and Baptists that is seemingly required to trigger regulatory
action in the health care space, any protection of consumers is likely to
be incidental or accidental at best.17 Accordingly, absent proof to the
contrary, one should not pretend or assume that health care legislation or
regulation actually does much of anything to protect consumers—or was
ever intended to do so.18
With that unpleasant framing clearly established, we now turn to the
state action doctrine, which significantly limits the ability of antitrust
enforcers to attack publicly imposed restraints on competition.
II. THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
Federalism requires that we decide whether, when, and how states can
deviate from the dictates of federal law. In antitrust, the Supreme Court
developed and applied the state action doctrine, which gives states broad
discretion to override the commands of federal law.19 States may enact
legislation that contradicts the federal antitrust laws and immunizes
private actors from antitrust challenge, so long as the state satisfies two

15. P.J. O’ROURKE, ALL THE TROUBLE IN THE WORLD: THE LIGHTER SIDE OF
OVERPOPULATION, FAMINE, ECOLOGICAL DISASTER, ETHNIC HATRED, PLAGUE, AND POVERTY
199 (1994).
16. David A. Hyman, Getting the Haves to Come Out Behind: Fixing the Distributive Injustices
of American Health Care, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 265, 271 (2006) [hereinafter Hyman,
Getting the Haves]; David A. Hyman, Regulating Managed Care: What’s Wrong with a Patient
Bill of Rights, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 221, 271 (2000).
17. Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists in Retrospect, 22 REG. 5, 5 (1999),
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/1999/10/bootleggers.pdf
(“[D]urable social regulation evolves when it is demanded by both of two distinctly different
groups. ‘Baptists’ point to the moral high ground and give vital and vocal endorsement of laudable
public benefits promised by a desired regulation. . . . ‘Bootleggers’ . . . . who expect to profit from
the very regulatory restrictions desired by Baptists, grease the political machinery with some of the
expected proceeds.”).
18. Hyman, Getting the Haves, supra note 16, at 279 (“[T]o date, provider capture of state and
federal legislators and regulators is the rule, and the results have not been pretty. Indeed, the status
quo . . . is the direct result of regulatory and legislative oversight, with its known susceptibility to
symbolic blackmail, ‘motherhood and apple pie’ initiatives, and other forms of government
failure.”).
19. The doctrine originated in Parker v. Brown, which rejected a claim that a state-approved
scheme to prorate raisin production in California violated the Sherman Act’s ban on
monopolization and conspiracies to monopolize. 317 U.S. 341, 368 (1943).
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conditions:20 (1) the state must clearly articulate its purpose to suppress
rivalry;21 and (2) the state must actively supervise implementation of the
anticompetitive regime.22
These requirements have tripped up some of the clumsier attempts to
use the power of the state to restrict competition.23 But, for those who
are able to follow (fairly simple) directions, the path to a governmentenforced cartel is well marked. Unsurprisingly, health care providers
have taken full advantage of the invitation to clothe their anticompetitive
behavior in the protective garb provided by the state action doctrine.
Worse still, courts have shown that they are quite willing to accept even
far-fetched invocations of the state action doctrine—although there has
been a welcome trend in recent years toward a more restrictive
application of the doctrine.24
We now turn to our case study, drawn from the depths of the
pharmaceutical market.
III. PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETS AND MACS
Pharmaceuticals come in two varieties: branded and generic. Branded
drugs capture most of the media attention and are responsible for a
heavily disproportionate share of drug spending—but generic
prescriptions account for more than 85 percent of filled prescriptions.25
Generic drugs are significantly cheaper than branded drugs, but, in recent
years, generic drug prices have trended upward—sometimes sharply.26
20. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1980).
21. FTC. v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003, 1006 (2013).
22. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1110 (2015).
23. See South Carolina State Board of Dentistry, FED. TRADE COMMISSION,
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/0210128/south-carolina-state-boarddentistry-matter (last updated Sept. 11, 2007) (discussing the settlement of a case charging the
South Carolina State Board of Dentistry with unlawfully restraining competition by enacting a rule
requiring a dentist to examine every child before a dental hygienist could provide preventative
dental care in schools, even though that rule was directly contrary to state law).
24. Compare FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT OF THE FTC STATE ACTION TASK FORCE 1
(2003), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/report-state-action-task-forcerecommendations-clarify-and-reaffirm-original-purposes-state-action/stateactionreport_0.pdf,
with Phoebe Putney Health Sys., 133 S. Ct. at 1005 (holding that the hospital authority was not
entitled to state action immunity because the State did not clearly articulate or affirm an express
policy).
25. Aria A. Razmaria, Generic Drugs, 315 JAMA 2746, 2746 (2016).
26. Victoria Colliver, Prices Soar for Some Generic Drugs, S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 1, 2014, 12:13
PM),
http://www.sfgate.com/health/article/Prices-soar-for-some-generic-drugs-5105538.php;
Dennis Thompson, U.S. Prices Soaring for Some Generic Drugs, Experts Say, U.S. NEWS (Nov.
12, 2014, 5:00 PM), http://health.usnews.com/health-news/articles/2014/11/12/us-prices-soaringfor-some-generic-drugs-experts-say.
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Like any other product, generic drug pricing is affected by both supplyside and demand-side factors.27
How much should pharmacies be paid for dispensing
pharmaceuticals—and on what basis? That problem has vexed insurers,
PBMs, state Medicaid programs, and health policy experts for decades.
In most markets, published prices provide a reasonable starting point (if
not the actual benchmark) for gauging the amount that must be paid to
acquire a product. But, as we detail below, matters in pharmaceutical
markets are considerably more complex—in part because of the product
life cycle of generic drugs, and in other part because of competition
within the pharmaceutical supply chain. As such, using published prices
virtually ensures that pharmacies will be overpaid—sometimes
substantially so—for dispensing drugs. Considerable evidence indicates
that payors have been overpaying for prescription drugs (both branded
and generic) for decades. We focus in this Article on generic drugs. We
begin with a brief description of the life cycle of generics, and of the
nature of competition within the pharmaceutical supply chain.
A. Pricing and the Life Cycle of Generic Drugs
A generic pharmaceutical’s life cycle typically starts with a 180-day
period of marketing exclusivity, which the Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”) grants to the first generic that receives approval.28 During this
180-day period, the first approved generic competes only with the brand
name version of the product and any “authorized generics” that the brand
manufacturer either makes itself or allows on the market through
licensing agreements.
If only one generic is available during the 180-day period, pharmacies
can typically acquire the drug for about 20 percent less than the brand
“list” price.29 If “authorized generics” are also available, the competition
is greater—so the pharmacy’s acquisition cost may be 30 percent less
than the brand “list” price.30 Drug wholesalers also seek to negotiate
27. Of late, there has been a significant run-up in the cost of some generic drugs. See Jonathan
D. Alpern et al., High-Cost Generic Drugs—Implications for Patients and Policymakers, 371 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1859, 1860 (2014) (“Numerous factors may cause price increases for non–patentprotected drugs, including drug shortages, supply disruptions, and consolidations within the
generic-drug industry.”).
28. To secure this marketing exclusivity, the generic drug company must also file what is known
as a “paragraph IV certification.” This document indicates that the generic drug company believes
any applicable patents are either invalid or will not be infringed.
29. ADAM J. FEIN, DRUG CHANNELS INSTITUTE 2014–15 ECONOMIC REPORT ON RETAIL,
MAIL, AND SPECIALTY PHARMACIES 129 (Jan. 2015).
30. Id. at 129–30.
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discounts, which can be as high as 40–50 percent off the brand “list” price
when an authorized generic is available.31 In a competitive market, these
discounts will be passed on to pharmacies. But the “list” price does not
typically reflect the impact of these discounts, or it significantly lags the
impact of these discounts.
Once the 180-day exclusivity period ends, the market is open to any
generic approved by the FDA, and dramatic savings can result if many
generics enter the market—as will happen for highly prescribed
medications.32 Again, the “list” price typically does not reflect the impact
of these price drops, or it significantly lags the impacts of these price
declines.
After one to two years, the market for a particular generic drug
typically matures. Some manufacturers may exit the marketplace due to
low margins or an eroding market for the drug, or as newer medications
in the same class also become available in generic form.33 Mergers can
also reduce the number of manufacturers producing a particular drug. As
the number of drug manufacturers declines, prices may increase. Prices
may also increase in the event of shortages whether due to manufacturing
problems or interruptions in the supply of an active ingredient. Other
generic drug manufacturers cannot respond to price increases by entering
the market, unless they have FDA approval—and it can be time
consuming to obtain that approval. Once again, the “list” price generally
does not reflect the impact of this pricing volatility, or it significantly lags
the impact of these price changes.
B. Pricing and Supply Chain Competition
Wholesalers routinely offer discounts to pharmacies. The most
common discount is for prompt payment, but wholesalers may also
provide discounts to pharmacies that purchase a minimum quantity of
generic drugs. Alternatively, wholesalers can provide discounts on brand
name drugs as long as the pharmacy purchases a minimum volume of
generic drugs. Drug wholesalers offer these incentives because they earn
a disproportionate share of their profits from generics; in 2014, generics
generated 16 percent of wholesaler revenues, but 75 percent of
wholesaler profits.34
31. Id. at 130.
32. For example, after the 180-day exclusivity period ended for the first generic version of the
Lexapro (a popular antidepressant), the United States Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)
approved eleven additional generics. The additional competition drove the price per 10 mg pill
down from $2.63 to $0.16 within a month—a 94 percent decrease. Id. at 130–31.
33. Id. at 131.
34. Id. at 113.
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To enhance their negotiating leverage, independent pharmacies often
form buying groups (i.e., a pharmacy services administrative
organization (“PSAO”)) to concentrate their purchases with one or more
preferred vendors. In exchange for the PSAO selecting a wholesaler as
its preferred vendor, the wholesaler may then agree to provide discounts
to the group’s consolidated purchases. Some of these discounts may be
paid as a quarterly rebate based on the aggregate volume of generics
purchased by the group.35 None of these discounts or rebates are
typically reflected in the “list” prices for generics, and they also may not
be reflected in the invoice associated with the drug purchase.
C. MACs’ Origins
When Medicaid was launched it sought to pay providers their actual
and justifiable costs—and not one penny more. MACs emerged in the
Medicaid program as a tool to do just that: set pharmaceutical spending
at the minimum amount necessary to obtain the drug in question. State
and federal regulations govern the amount that Medicaid can reimburse
for prescription drugs. Before MACs were developed, reimbursement
generally involved paying the lesser of the Estimated Acquisition Cost
(“EAC”) plus a reasonable dispensing fee, or the providers’ usual and
customary charges to the general public. The EAC was typically
determined based on published “list” prices, including the Average
Wholesale Price (“AWP”).
At one time, the AWP reflected the pharmacy’s acquisition costs, but
it quickly became apparent that there was considerable divergence
between the AWP and pharmacists’ true acquisition cost, particularly as
generic drugs became more prevalent. Once this fact became clear, it was
necessary to modify Medicaid’s reimbursement formula to ensure that
the amounts paid reflected pharmacists’ actual costs (i.e., the acquisition
cost plus the costs associated with dispensing the pharmaceutical).
In 1987, the federal government responded by requiring states to
implement an aggregate payment limit for specific drugs. 36 The payment
limit (known as a Federal Upper Limit (“FUL”)) was determined
mechanically.37 Pursuant to this payment limit, the dispensing pharmacy
35. Id. at 112.
36. 42 C.F.R. § 447.301–447.371.
37. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act modified the formula for calculating a
payment limit. The federal government is still in the process of implementing this change. For an
estimate of the impact of these changes, see generally OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., ANALYZING
CHANGES
TO
MEDICAID
FEDERAL
UPPER
LIMIT
AMOUNTS
(2012),
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-03-11-00650.pdf.
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was paid a flat amount for acquiring the dispensed drug, irrespective of
its actual acquisition cost. But some state Medicaid program directors
believed they were still overpaying for many drugs. Those states
responded by adopting MAC programs, which were similar to FULs, but
applied to a far broader array of drugs, and set lower reimbursement
levels.38 Medicaid MACs are calculated based on aggregate figures that
reflect pharmacies’ average acquisition cost for a given pharmaceutical
product. As of January 12, 2012, all states used FULs and approximately
forty-five states used MACs in their Medicaid programs.39
For drugs not subject to FULs and MACs, states implemented
additional cost control measures, including paying pharmacies based on
published Wholesale Acquisition Costs (“WACs”), or applying a
standardized discount to published AWPs. In combination, these
measures brought the amounts paid for pharmaceuticals closer to the
actual acquisition costs incurred by pharmacies.
D. Private Sector Use of MACs
PBMs use contracts to create pharmacy networks. Approximately 95
percent of the nation’s retail pharmacies are included in one or more PBM
pharmacy networks. A pharmacy that joins a network agrees to accept
the terms in their contract (often called a Participating Pharmacy
Agreement (“PPA”)). The PPA specifies how pharmacies will be
reimbursed, details the nature of any MACs that may apply, and spells
out the process for resolving disputes. Pharmacies are free to decline to
contract with an insurer/PBM for whatever reason they choose—
including inadequate reimbursement, uncertainty about the level of
reimbursement, or the “hassle factor” of dealing with a particular
insurer/PBM.
In designing and implementing a PPA, the PBM must balance two
competing goals: (1) it wants to ensure a broad network of pharmacies at
which prescriptions may be filled (because ease of access to covered
services is one of the “products” the PBM sells to payors), but (2) it also
has to control the cost of the covered services (because low cost is also
one of the “products” the PBM sells). If a PBM errs in one direction (e.g.,
through overly generous payments for pharmaceuticals), it will ensure a
broad network of pharmacies, but the covered services will be less
affordable—meaning the PBM may not get the business for which it is

38. Richard G. Abramson et al, Generic Drug Cost Containment in Medicaid: Lessons from
Five State MAC Programs, 25 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 25, 25 (2004).
39. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., MEDICAID DRUG PRICING IN STATE MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE
COST PROGRAMS 5–6 (2013), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-03-11-00640.pdf.
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bidding. Conversely, if the PBM errs in the other direction (e.g., through
inadequate payment for pharmaceuticals, excessive hassle factor or DIR
fees, and the like), pharmacies will decline to contract, drop out of the
PBMs’ network, or refuse to stock a sufficient supply of the
pharmaceuticals for which they deem the MAC payment to be
insufficient. Employers and employees will not value a pharmacy
network that is too limited along any of these dimensions—meaning the
PBM may not get the business for which it is bidding.
When properly designed, MACs help PBMs steer a middle ground
between these two extremes. By paying the average acquisition costs
incurred by a well-run pharmacy, MACs create the necessary incentive
for pharmacies to purchase and dispense of the lowest-priced generics
that are available in the market. Of course, periodic adjustments are
necessary to deal with unanticipated or extraordinary circumstances, but
market forces serve to discipline overreaching by all involved parties
(e.g., pharmacies, PBMs, and employers/employee benefit plans).
E. The Effect of MACs: A Dose of Theory
MACs have at least five distinct effects. First, MACs encourage
pharmacies to dispense the generic version of applicable
pharmaceuticals. Second, MACs heighten competition among generic
manufacturers. Third, MACs help ensure that pharmacies are not being
overpaid for the services they provide. Fourth, MACs lower spending on
pharmaceutical benefits, thereby reducing the cost of prescription drug
coverage. Finally, MACs make prescription drug reimbursement more
efficient.
1. Incentivizing Pharmacies to Dispense Generics
When pharmacies are only paid the amount specified in the MAC, they
have a substantially increased incentive to acquire and dispense generic
drugs.40 This dynamic means that a MAC will increase the share of
generic drugs that are dispensed, compared to a pure cost-based
reimbursement system. In the absence of a MAC, the pharmacy’s
incentives are quite different because it will be paid based on a “list” price
that often bears little resemblance to the actual acquisition cost. Under
those circumstances (i.e., absent a MAC) a pharmacy that dispenses a
higher-priced drug (i.e., the brand name version) will actually be paid
more, thus increasing the cost of providing prescription drug benefits
40. Id. at 5 (“Because pharmacy reimbursement is based on a single [maximum allowable cost
(“MAC”)] price (regardless of whether a generic or brand version of a drug is dispensed), the
program creates a financial incentive to substitute lower-cost generic equivalents for their brandname counterparts.”).
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without providing any commensurate benefits.
2. Increasing Competition Among Generic Manufacturers
When pharmacies only receive the amount specified in the MAC, they
have an increased incentive to “shop for the best deal,” and find generic
drugs at the lowest possible price (because they get to keep the difference
between the acquisition price and the MAC). This heightens price
competition among generic drug manufacturers and drug wholesalers,
who know that offering lower-priced generics will help drive more sales.
Absent a MAC, pharmacies have a lower incentive to buy the lowestcost generic because their reimbursement is based on the “list” price
(which, as noted above, often bears little relationship to the acquisition
cost). Under those circumstances, pharmacies will predictably seek to
maximize the difference between the “list” price and their actual cost,
rather than simply buying the lowest-cost generic.
3. Ensuring Pharmacies Are Not Overpaid
Cost-based reimbursement can lead to various forms of gaming that
result in excess payments to pharmacies. For example, pharmacies have
an incentive to dispense higher-priced drugs, particularly if they are paid
a percentage markup on their incurred costs. MACs help prevent this
behavior, and ensure that the requisite services are obtained at a level
consistent with actual costs.
4. Lowering Prescription Drug Spending and the Cost of Prescription
Drug Coverage
When we combine the first three effects with the lower price at which
generics are dispensed, it becomes clear that MACs help lower
prescription drug spending, which in turn reduces the cost of prescription
drug coverage. In an analysis of Medicaid MACs, the Department of
Health and Human Services (“HHS”) Office of Inspector General
(“OIG”) concluded that MACs had “significant value” in “containing
Medicaid drug costs.”41 The OIG also noted that if all states adopted the
strictest MAC program that was used in 2011, generic drug spending
would decline by more than 20 percent in fourteen states, and total
Medicaid pharmaceutical spending would be $966 million lower.42
5. Enhanced Market Efficiency
Each drug manufacturer has its own unique “list” price for every
41. Id. at 21 (“Our findings demonstrate the significant value MAC programs have in containing
Medicaid drug costs.”).
42. Id. Wyoming’s MAC program resulted in the greatest aggregate savings.

12_HYMAN (757-85).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

Competition Law in the Shadow of State Action

5/30/2017 12:01 PM

771

dosage and variation of each drug that they sell. As discussed previously,
these “list” prices vary widely, and bear little relationship to pharmacies’
actual acquisition cost. A MAC cuts through the forest of individual
“list” prices, and specifies the reimbursement that will be paid, regardless
of the “list” price and the actual acquisition cost. Payors need not inquire
into the specifics of individual transactions, and instead will simply pay
the standardized amount. By eliminating the need to conduct
individualized assessments, MACs help lower transaction costs and
structure the market more efficiently, thereby improving system
performance.
F. Legislative Efforts
As detailed in the Appendix, in the last three years, thirty-seven states
adopted MAC-related legislation.43 These statutes vary in their details,
but many require public disclosure of each PBMs’ MACs and the
methodology for arriving at the amounts that will be paid; limit the
circumstances in which MACs may be used (i.e., by requiring a certain
number of A-rated equivalents); require the submission of proprietary
information regarding MACs to public authorities; and specify particular
methods and time frames for MAC appeals and payment adjustments,
including requiring retroactive payments. In a few instances, states
require PBMs to reimburse the actual acquisition costs that are incurred,
even if a cheaper alternative was available in the marketplace.
G. Likely Effects of MAC Legislation
From a competition law perspective, none of these initiatives are likely
to improve the performance of the pharmaceutical market, and most seem
likely to make things worse. First, restrictive state-specific criteria
undermine the flexibility of PBMs to develop and implement MACs.
Mandatory public disclosure of MACs and the specifics of the underlying
methodologies are unlikely to benefit consumers because both will
probably lead to less intensive competition and higher prices.44
43. In addition, federal legislation was proposed, but was not enacted. Medicare Prescription
Drug Program Integrity and Transparency Act of 2013, S. 867, 113th Cong. (2013),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/867.
44. In pharmaceutical markets, the intensity of competition is a function of various factors,
including the ability of a pharmacy benefit managers (“PBM”) to obtain a competitive advantage
by developing more effective MACs. Forced disclosure of MAC methodologies may undermine
PBMs’ incentive to invest in such efforts (because other PBMs will be able to free ride). In that
environment, PBMs will be less likely to innovate—meaning that MACs will be less effective than
they could be. Stated differently, compelled disclosure can create a risk to competition, which is
likely to result in higher prices for consumers.
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Requiring specific methods and time frames for MAC appeals and
payment adjustments—including requiring “retroactive” payments—is
also likely to have unintended effects. Such provisions seem likely to
result in administrative complexity and unpredictability, which will in
turn result in increased costs.
The provisions that require PBMs to pay at least actual acquisition
costs are particularly pernicious. The inflationary consequences of costbased reimbursement are well known and help explain why such
reimbursement schemes have fallen into disfavor in health care.45 The
The FTC has studied these issues, and issued three detailed advocacy letters in 2004, 2006, and
2011 on the impact of mandated disclosure of PBM contract terms. Letter from Susan A.
Creighton, Dir., Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Greg Aghazarian, Assembly
Member
(Sept.
7,
2004),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-comment-hon.gregaghazarian-concerning-ca.b.1960-requiring-pharmacy-benefit-managers-make-disclosurespurchasers-and-prospective-purchasers/v040027.pdf; Letter from Susan S. DeSanti et al., Dir.,
Office of Policy Planning, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Mark Formby, Representative, Miss. House of
Representatives
(Mar.
22,
2011),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-letter-honorablemark-formby-mississippi-house-representatives-concerningmississippi/110322mississippipbm.pdf; Letter from Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Dir., Office of Policy
Planning, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Terry G. Kilgore, Member, Commonwealth of Va House of
Delegates
(Oct.
2,
2006),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-commenthon.terry-g.kilgore-concerning-virginia-house-bill-no.945-regulate-contractual-relationshipbetween-pharmacy-benefit-managers-and-both-health-benefit/v060018.pdf.
The FTC and Department of Justice also issued a lengthy joint report on health care and
competition policy in 2004 that discussed these issues, and a report in 2005 that provided extensive
information on PBM operations. See generally FTC-DOJ, IMPROVING, supra note 3 (noting the
2004 joint report); FED. TRADE COMM’N, PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS: OWNERSHIP OF MAILORDER
PHARMACIES
(2005),
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/pharmbenefit05/050906pharmbenefitrpt.pdf (noting the 2015 report).
To be sure, the FTC was studying a different set of issues, but the risks to competition of compelled
transparency are analogous. One of us (Hyman) was a co-author of the 2004 advocacy letter, and
both of us worked on the FTC-DOJ report.
45. Prior to 1983, Medicare relied on cost-based reimbursement for inpatient hospitalization.
Medicare payments were accordingly based on whatever costs the hospital incurred—and each
hospital had virtually complete freedom to determine its own cost structure. The result was entirely
predictable: Medicare costs for inpatient treatment skyrocketed, as hospitals determined that there
were no effective constraints on the amounts they could bill, as long as they had legitimately
incurred the associated costs.
After the consequences of cost-based reimbursement became clear, a bipartisan consensus in
favor of a different payment system emerged. In 1983, Medicare switched to a prospective payment
system (“PPS”), which paid a standardized amount, irrespective of the actual costs incurred by the
hospital. A small number of hospitals were excluded from the PPS. But payment for the
overwhelming majority of hospitals switched virtually overnight from cost-based reimbursement
to the PPS.
Hospitals suddenly had an incentive to pay attention to the costs they incurred for treating each
patient, instead of simply passing those costs on. Although there have been issues with the
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same dynamic has played out in the context of government
procurement.46 The problems with cost-based contracts were well known
to defense contractors and to Congress.47 Federal procurement
regulations now specify that cost-based reimbursement contracts may
only be used when the contracting officer certifies that a fixed-price type
contract cannot be used.48
In sum, restrictions on the use of MACs that push pharmaceutical
purchasing toward cost-based reimbursement will lead to increases in
pharmaceutical spending and increases in the cost of prescription drug
coverage. The magnitude of these increases is obviously subject to
considerable uncertainty,49 but the directional effect seems clear.
implementation of PPS, there has been no serious discussion of a return to cost-based
reimbursement for hospitals.
46. For many years, the federal government used cost-based procurement for defense contracts.
Unfortunately, this approach created little incentive for defense contractors to perform in the most
efficient way possible, because they knew their costs would be reimbursed, however much they
were. Cost-based reimbursement also meant that the government assumed most of the risks of
performance, because it had agreed to pay the contractor its full allowable incurred costs until the
job was accomplished, or the contract was terminated. Unsurprisingly, cost-based contracts
sometimes resulted in sizeable cost overruns (relative to the originally estimated and budgeted cost)
for defense procurement.
47. A book by then-Representative Henry Waxman concisely summarizes the prevailing
wisdom on the perils of cost-based reimbursement: “One Halliburton official told us that the
company’s mantra was ‘Don’t worry about price. It’s ‘cost-plus.’ One needn’t be a math whiz to
understand how quickly this system inflates costs and even gives contractors an incentive to run up
enormous bills.” HENRY WAXMAN, THE WAXMAN REPORT: HOW CONGRESS REALLY WORKS
155 (2009).
48. 48 C.F.R. § 16.301-2 (2012). More specifically, the contracting officer must certify that the
circumstances do not allow the agency to define its requirements sufficiently to allow for a fixedprice type contract; or the uncertainties involved in contract performance do not permit costs to
be estimated with sufficient accuracy to use any type of fixed-price contract. And, when a costbased contract is used, the contracting officer is required to employ appropriate surveillance
measures, to provide assurance that efficient methods and effective cost controls are in place. Id.
§ 16-301-3(a).
49. We have located two attempts to “score” the impact of state-level regulation of MACs. One
study, conducted by Visante, estimated that spending on the affected pharmaceuticals would
increase by 31–56 percent, with a nationwide impact of $6.2 billion increased spending annually.
VISANTE, PROPOSED MAC LEGISLATION MAY INCREASE COSTS OF AFFECTED GENERIC DRUGS
BY MORE THAN 50 PERCENT 2 (2015). Importantly, this estimate captures only the immediate
fiscal impact, and not the more long-term indirect consequences.
The second study was performed by the Washington Health Care Authority (“WHCA”), and
involved “scoring” the financial impact of proposed legislation that prohibited PBMs from paying
pharmacies less than their actual acquisition cost. WHCA concluded the proposed legislation
would make MAC lists much less effective, and would dramatically reduce pharmacies’ incentive
to acquire generic drugs at the lowest possible cost. Multiple Agency Fiscal Note Summary, S.B.
5857, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015). Although WHCA did not settle on a single number for
the fiscal impact of S.B. 5857, it presented a range of figures, up to and including a 10 percent
increase in the cost of pharmaceuticals. WHCA specifically determined that the legislation would
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H. How the Empire Struck Back: The Political Economy of MAC
Legislation
How did such overtly anticompetitive legislation get enacted in such
short order, and by so many states? A fundamental insight of health
policy is that every dollar of health care spending is a dollar of income
for health care providers.50 To the extent that MACs are effective at
reducing pharmaceutical spending on generic drugs, they reduce the
amounts that pharmacies receive for dispensing those same drugs. Not
surprisingly, pharmacists feel aggrieved that their services are not being
compensated at the handsome level that they believe their expertise and
professionalism justify—and they lobby for relief from the hardships
imposed by competitive markets.
Pharmacists began these lobbying campaigns with at least three
distinct advantages. First, like funeral directors and car dealerships, there
are one or more pharmacies in every legislative district, many of which
are small independent pharmacies. These small independent pharmacies
are pillars of the local business community. Second, if a legislator has to
pick sides, the small independent local pharmacy is a much more
appealing entity than a large, out-of-state PBM. Third, many legislators
believe there is a serious problem with access to pharmacy care in rural
areas where most pharmacies are small and independent.
Although chains account for a near majority of pharmacies in most
states, the protection of small independent local pharmacies from the
depredations of large out-of-state PBMs was the basis of the lobbying
campaign. The flames were fanned by references to the rebates that
PBMs were receiving from drug companies.51 Given these dynamics, it
is not surprising that we went from no states with MAC legislation at the
beginning of 2013 to thirty-seven states having such legislation only three
and a half years later.
1. Consequential Features of MAC Legislation
Three features of the MAC statutes listed in the Appendix deserve
further attention. First, although the legislative campaign was built
“significantly increase” costs for public employee benefits and would also have a cost-increasing
impact on Medicaid.
50. Hyman, Getting the Haves, supra note 16, at 280 (noting “the reality that every dollar of
health care spending by someone is a dollar of income for someone else”).
51. These rebates are paid on branded drugs—not generics—so it is difficult to see the relevance
of this argument to a dispute over whether PBMs are paying pharmacies the right amount for
dispensing generic drugs. And, the fact that PBMs may have multiple sources of revenue does not
translate into a legal or ethical obligation to share any of that revenue with pharmacies. Instead,
competitive dynamics determine how much PBMs must pay to induce pharmacies to participate in
a PBM’s network.
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around the protection of independent (mostly rural) pharmacies, state
MAC statutes were not so limited. Instead, in all of these jurisdictions,
every single pharmacy—including chain drugstores in urban locations—
receives the benefits of the legislation. That strategy means the
legislation is not well targeted to address the supposed problem that it is
allegedly remedying. Stated differently, MAC legislation puts money in
the pockets of all pharmacies in a state, regardless of whether they “need”
it or not. To say the least, that is an exceedingly peculiar understanding
of “consumer protection.”
Second, in thirty-six of the thirty-seven states, the state Medicaid
program is excluded from the requirements imposed by the MAC
legislation.52 Many of these states also exclude state employees from the
“consumer protections” contained in the MAC statutes. The only thing
these two groups have in common is that the costs of their health coverage
are on-budget expenses, borne (either in whole or in part) by the state in
its sovereign capacity. By excluding these populations from the scope of
MAC legislation, state legislators made it clear that they thought the
supposed consumer protections were worth doing—right up until the
moment the state would bear the costs of doing so. This pattern is
certainly not unique to MAC legislation, but it provides a useful (albeit
underinclusive) signal of legislation that is provider protection
masquerading as consumer protection.53
Finally, in some states, the legislative history casts light on whose
interests are actually being protected. When Iowa was considering MAC
legislation, one overly enthusiastic legislator stated that the legislation
was necessary because the lack of regulation was “eroding local
pharmacies.”54 Another Iowa legislator explained that legislation was
necessary because PBMs were engaging in “unfair business practices that
hurt community pharmacies and their patients.”55 Similarly, when
Washington enacted MAC legislation, the Office of Insurance
Commissioner was instructed to conduct a study that would, inter alia,
“discuss suggestions that recognize the unique nature of small and rural

52. The exceptions are Mississippi and Texas.
53. David A. Hyman, Drive-Through Deliveries: Is Consumer Protection Just What the Doctor
Ordered?, 78 N.C. L. REV. 5, 25–26 (1999) (noting that the majority of the states that enacted
prohibitions on drive-through deliveries excluded state employees and Medicaid beneficiaries from
the statute).
54. Pharm. Care Mgmt. Assoc. v. Gerhardt, No. 4:13-cv-000345, 2015 WL 10767327, at *3
(S.D. Iowa Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.ncpa.co/pdf/iowa-order-granting-motion-to-dismiss-as-toremaining-claims.pdf (order).
55. Id.
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pharmacies and possible options that support a viable business model that
do not increase the cost of pharmacy products.”56 As these examples
indicate, MAC legislation is provider protection—not consumer
protection.
2. Some Empirical Evidence
The legislative campaign against MACs turned on whether pharmacies
were being paid enough for dispensing generic drugs, with the two sides
staking out competing positions on various factual matters.
Pharmacies insisted that PBMs were underpaying them, by setting
MAC levels too low, and failing to update them quickly enough when
acquisition costs increased. Pharmacies argued that the resulting
shortfalls in payment placed considerable financial pressure on
independent pharmacies (particularly those in rural areas), causing
closures and more limited access to pharmacy services.
PBMs insisted that they were paying the correct amounts. They argued
that pharmacies that were losing money on dispensed generic
prescriptions were either paying higher acquisition costs than they needed
to; were mistaken about the transactions in question; or did not realize
that MACs were intended to average out across all the generic
prescriptions dispensed by a well-run pharmacy, with over-payments on
some drugs compensating for under-payments on others.
What do we actually know about these issues (i.e., MAC usage and
levels, and access to pharmacy services)? We consider each in turn.
a. MAC Usage and Levels
One of us (Professor Hyman) interviewed personnel at four PBMs
about their use of MACs during April and May 2016.57 All four PBMs
used MACs for most drugs that were available in generic form. MACs
were typically set for each generic drug in all of the available dosing
strengths. MAC levels were set based on pricing information from
various sources, including Medicaid MAC and FUL lists; and price lists
from wholesalers and other sources (e.g., National Average Drug
Acquisition Cost (“NADAC”) and Medi-Span). All four PBMs used this
pricing information to create their own MAC lists—each using its own
proprietary methods. Each PBM maintained multiple MAC lists, which
varied depending on the contracts with plan sponsors. Some MAC lists
were regional, but most were applied on a national basis. All four PBMs

56. S.B. 5857, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015).
57. The interviews were conducted with a promise of confidentiality, so we are unable to
identify the four PBMs that participated in the study.
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insisted that they took account of changes in drug acquisition costs in
updating their MAC lists—in some instances doing so on a daily basis.
Each PBM had its own appeals mechanism. Appeals were triggered
when a pharmacy submitted documentation confirming that the drug was
actually dispensed to a PBM customer, and that the MAC was below the
pharmacy’s actual acquisition cost. All of the PBMs used the information
derived from appeals as part of a feedback loop to inform the levels at
which MACs were set. All four PBMs reported that appeals were a small
share (i.e., much less than 1 percent) of the total transactions they
handled.
Of course, there are limitations to qualitative studies of this sort. None
of those being interviewed were under oath. MACs are a hot issue, and
those being interviewed were unlikely to volunteer information that
would make their employers look bad. Qualitative research can provide
information about how PBMs create and maintain their MAC lists—but
only quantitative research can answer the question of how often PBMs
pay pharmacies less (and more) than their acquisition cost; how large
those deviations actually are; whether there are any time trends in these
patterns; and whether the drugs in question were available for less from
a different wholesaler than the one used by the pharmacy in question.
It is exceedingly difficult to conduct such research because the
pharmaceutical marketplace is quite dynamic, data from multiple sources
is required, and all of the PBMs treat their MAC lists as proprietary and
confidential. Notwithstanding those difficulties, Washington’s 2016
MAC legislation required the Washington Office of Insurance
Commissioner to conduct a quantitative study of these issues. 58 The
report, which was published in February 2017, gave some support to both
sides in the debate.59 But regardless of the results of such studies, from
an economic perspective what matters is whether pharmacies are willing
to participate in the networks that PBMs have created, and whether those
networks are acceptable to payors. Everything else is sound and fury,

58. S.B. 5857, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015).
59. HEALTH MGMT. ASSOCS., STUDY OF THE PHARMACY CHAIN OF SUPPLY 34 (2016),
https://www.insurance.wa.gov/current-issues-reform/pharmacy-benefitmanagers/documents/pharmacy-supply-chain-study.pdf. More specifically, the study found that
the number of drugs that were on a PBM’s MAC list “varied significantly” across PBMs; MAC
lists resulted in “payments to pharmacies that are higher than the [National Average Drug
Acquisition Cost (“NADAC”)] benchmark price and lower than the regional benchmark prices;”
one PBM “paid rural pharmacies less than all benchmarks,” while two PBMs paid more; and five
of the six PBMs that were studied “paid independent pharmacies more than chain drug stores in the
NADAC analysis.” Id. at 35.
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signifying nothing.60
b. Access to Pharmacy Services
Pharmacists obviously care a great deal about whether their pharmacy
closes its doors, and whether it is operated by a chain or is independent.
But it is less obvious that anyone else should be all that invested in those
issues. We should care about whether patients have access to pharmacy
services, and not nearly as much (if at all) about the specifics of how those
services are delivered. And, we should know more about the relevant
size of the geographic market for pharmacy services before concluding
any given pharmacy closure is a problem.61
That said, there is evidence that there have been a material number of
closures of rural pharmacies.62 But, this trend long pre-dates the recent
dispute over MAC levels, and the number of closures was much higher
in 2007–09, with subsequent trends “not as pronounced or as clear as in
earlier years.”63 More importantly, a recent study of access to pharmacy
services for Medicare Part D beneficiaries by the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services found that 99 percent of urban beneficiaries had
access to a pharmacy within two miles; 99 percent of suburban
beneficiaries had access to a pharmacy within five miles; and 97 percent
of rural beneficiaries had access to a pharmacy within fifteen miles.64
60. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 5, sc. 5 (“[I]t is a tale Told by an idiot, full of sound
and fury, Signifying nothing.”).
61. For example, when Illinois was debating tort reform in 2003–05, it was routinely noted that
there were no neurosurgeons south of Springfield. No one ever discussed whether we actually
should be concerned about the number of neurosurgeons south of Springfield—particularly when
Carbondale, Illinois is closer to St. Louis, Missouri (96 miles) than to Springfield, Illinois (160
miles).
62. See, e.g., Kelli Todd et al., Rural Pharmacy Closures: Implications for Rural Communities,
RUPRI
Brief
No.
2012-5
(Jan.
2013),
https://www.publichealth.uiowa.edu/rupri/publications/policybriefs/2013/Pharmacist%20Loss%20Brief%20022813.
pdf.
63. Fred Ullrich & Keith Mueller, Update: Independently Owned Pharmacy Closures in Rural
America,
2003—2013,
RUPRI
Brief
No.
2014-7
(June
2014),
http://cph.uiowa.edu/rupri/publications/policybriefs/2014/Pharm%20Closure%20Brief%20June%
202014.pdf. See also Donald Klepser et al., Independently Owned Pharmacy Closures in Rural
America,
RUPRI
Brief
No.
2008-2
(July
2008),
http://cph.uiowa.edu/rupri/publications/policybriefs/2008/b20082%20Independently%20Owned%20Pharmacy%20Closures.pdf (researching why independently
owned pharmacies in rural America closed).
64. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., ANALYSIS OF PART D BENEFICIARY ACCESS
TO
PREFERRED
COST
SHARING
PHARMACIES
(PCSPS)
5
(2015),
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Prescription-DrugCoverage/PrescriptionDrugCovContra/Downloads/PCSP-Key-Results-Report-Finalv04302015.pdf.
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These findings suggest that pharmacy closures have not had a material
impact on access to pharmacy services.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. How Representative Are MACs?
This Article presents a single case study. Readers might well ask
whether we cherry-picked a particularly egregious example of rent
seeking to justify our conclusions. We do not believe that our findings
are skewed by the specific example we have chosen. In previous work,
we examined other examples of health care regulation, including
restrictions on entry (i.e., licensure and certificates of need/public
necessity) and restrictions on the terms for which goods and services may
be provided (i.e., mandated benefits, any willing provider legislation, and
other planks in what used to be known as the “patient bill of rights”). The
MAC-related findings presented in this Article are fully consistent with
the findings in our earlier work.
Other scholars have reached similar conclusions about health care
legislation and regulation.65 And there is rich public choice literature
documenting that similar complaints may be lodged at legislation and
regulation across all substantive areas of law and policy. Whatever one
might want to say in defense of MAC statutes, they fit comfortably into
a rich tradition, where “the favored pastime of state and local
governments” is the “dishing out [of] special economic benefits to certain
in-state industries.”66
B. Balance This!
The symposium at which this Article was presented was framed around
the optimal balance between competition and consumer protection. That
issue is obviously difficult and complex, and no one has come up with a
perfect solution to the problem. That is why it provides a good subject
for a symposium. Balancing competition against provider protection
masquerading as consumer protection is another matter entirely. That
problem is easy.67 Indeed, most of what passes as consumer protection
in health care is, in fact, provider protection. We should stop pretending
otherwise.

65. Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, Distributive Injustice(s) in American Health
Care, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 8–9 (2006).
66. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1221 (10th Cir. 2004).
67. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 640 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(“Perhaps the adage about hard cases making bad law should be revised to cover easy cases.”).
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C. Implications of Our Analysis for the State Action Doctrine
Our findings obviously call into question both the scope of the state
action doctrine and the deference that doctrine gives to the decisions of
state legislators. MAC statutes exemplify the degree to which private
economic actors are willing and able to enlist state authority to obstruct
entry or otherwise restrict competitive threats to incumbent market
participants.68 And, as noted previously, these efforts make perfect
sense.69 The relentless expansion of criminal antitrust enforcement has
created powerful incentives for firms to seek comfort from state
legislators.70 Privately agree with your competitors to exclude rivals, and
you may go to jail; get the state to do it for you, and it is the competitors
who may face a prison sentence for failing to comply.
State action also has distributional consequences—including spillover
anticompetitive effects in other states. The benefits of MAC legislation
are captured by in-state pharmacies, but the costs are largely externalized
to out-of-state PBMs—particularly during the term of lock-in contracts
between PBMs and payors.71 Previous commentators have noted the
importance of limiting state action immunity to laws that have little or no
spillovers into other states.72 Retrenchment of the state action doctrine,
along with closer and more skeptical scrutiny of state-based restrictions
on competition would reflect the reality that the limits imposed by one
state routinely damage the interests of citizens in other states—
particularly when electronic commerce has diminished the amount of
commerce that is truly “local.”
For those who are concerned with distributive (in)justice, health care
regulation exemplifies the various ways in which “the haves come out
ahead.”73 Of course, such reverse-Robin Hood schemes are not limited
68. The expansion of state licensure requirements is documented in Aaron Edlin & Rebecca
Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Occupational Licensing and the Quality of Service, 162 U. PA. L.
REV. 1093, 1102–03 (2014); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Occupational Licensing,
39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 209, 212 (2016).
69. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
70. James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, U.S. Convergence with International Competition
Norms: Antitrust Law and Public Restraints on Competition, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1555, 1561–62
(2010).
71. PBMs contract with plan sponsors on either a “pass-through” or a “lock-in” basis. A lockin contract obligates the PBM to hit the contractually specified targets throughout the contractual
term, irrespective of changes in the pharmaceutical market—including changes in the amounts that
must be paid to dispensing pharmacies because of state MAC statutes.
72. Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State Action
Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism,
75 TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1217–18 (1997).
73. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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to health care. Many of the state restrictions that have been challenged
by the DOJ and FTC, whether through litigation or competition advocacy,
have perverse (i.e., upside down) distributional effects.74
Perhaps there is something to be learned from the ways in which other
countries handle these matters. Many countries closely scrutinize
anticompetitive state measures, and intervene forcefully to strike them
down.75 Other jurisdictions do allow political subdivisions to restrict
competition, but they subject such interventions to more demanding
standards and more frequently invalidate them.76 For example, the
European Commission places sharp limits on when a jurisdiction can
provide “state aid,” including an ex ante approval process that is backstopped by the availability of recoupment and restitution.77 These
approaches more fully address the destructive potential of state curbs on
competition than the “nothing to see here, move along” approach taken
by the United States in its implementation of the state action doctrine.
CONCLUSION
Our proposal is modest. We should begin by acknowledging two
simple facts: (1) virtually everything that is billed as “consumer
protection” in the health care space is actually “provider protection”; and
(2) the state action doctrine insulates such conduct, as well as other forms
of rent seeking from antitrust scrutiny—at least as long as the state can
satisfy the minimal hurdles created by the clear articulation and active
supervision requirements.
The antitrust laws work reasonably well in dealing with private
anticompetitive conduct, but the state action doctrine turns the antitrust
laws into a goalie that only guards half the net.78 That approach is not
working, and cannot be made to work. To continue our metaphor, players
quickly learn to shoot at the unguarded half of the net.79 We should treat
provider protection as a form of state aid, and use the competition laws
to strike down a substantially greater share of the rent-seeking statutes
74. Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 70, at 1565.
75. Eleanor M. Fox & Deborah Healey, When the State Harms Competition—The Role for
Competition Law, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 69, 69–70 (2014).
76. Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 70, at 1584–85.
77. State
Aid
Control,
EUR.
COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/index_en.html (last updated Dec. 9, 2016).
78. We leave it up to the reader to decide whether the hypothetical goalie is playing hockey,
lacrosse, soccer, or water polo.
79. See Muris, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that “as a competition system achieves success in
attacking private restraints, it increases the efforts that firms will devote to obtaining public
restraints”).
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that emerge from the legislative process. Of course, the toolkit for fixing
these problems is not limited to competition law. The list of “fixes”
should also include greater public scrutiny, routine-sun-setting, and a
healthy dose of skepticism about the operations of the administrative
state.80
What about the problem of striking the proper balance between true
consumer protections and competition? And, the obligations imposed by
federalism? Get back to us once the system has been purged of provider
protection. Until then, we all have bigger fish to catch, kill, and fry.

80. Hyman & Svorny, supra note 7, at 111.

12_HYMAN (757-85).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

5/30/2017 12:01 PM

Competition Law in the Shadow of State Action

783

APPENDIX: States with MAC Statutes

State

MAC Statute
ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-92-507 (2013)

Arkansas
California
Colorado
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky

S.B. 688, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Ark. 2015)
Assemb. B. 627, 2015-2016 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2015)
COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-37-103.5 (2016)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 3301A–3310A
(West 2016)
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 465.1862 (West 2015)
H.B. 470, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Ga. 2015)
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 328-106 (West
2015).
IOWA CODE § 510B.8 (2014)
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3822 (West 2016).
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A.162
(West 2013)
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.9-020 (West
2016)
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1863 (2014)

Louisiana

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1864 (2014)
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1865 (2014)

Maine

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 4317
(2016)

Maryland

MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-1628.1 (2014)

Minnesota

MINN. STAT. § 151.71 (2014)

Mississippi

MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-21-155(West 2016)

Missouri

MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.388 (West 2016)
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Montana
New Hampshire
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MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 33-22-170–33-22173 (2017)
H.B. 1664, Gen. Assemb., 2015 Sess.
(N.H. 2016)

New Jersey

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:27F (West 2016)

New Mexico

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-61-4 (2014)

New York

N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 280-a
(McKinney 2016)

North Carolina

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-56A-5 (2014)

North Dakota

N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-02.1-14.2 (2013)

Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Rhode Island
South Carolina

Tennessee

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3959.111 (West
2015)
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 357, 360
(West 2016)
OR. REV. STAT. § 735.534 (2013)
27 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 27-28-33.2
(West 2016)
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 38-71-2110, 38-712120, 38-71-2130, 38-71-2140
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-7-3106, 56-73111 (2015)
TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-3102 (2016)

Texas
Utah
Vermont

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 533.005 (West
2013)
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 1369.35–
1369.362 (2016)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-640 (West
2014)
VT. STAT. ANN. tit 18, §§ 9471, 9473
(West 2015)

Virginia

VA. CODE ANN. § 38-2-3407.15:3 (2015)

Washington

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.340.030,
19.340.010, 19.340.100 (West 2016)
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Wisconsin

WIS. STAT. § 632.865 (2015)

Wyoming

WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-52-101–26-52104 (West 2016)

